Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

The State of Utah v. Victor Vialpando : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alicia Cook; Deputy District Attorney; Attorney for Appellee.
Shannon N. Romero; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Vialpando, No. 20020405 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3806

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

VICTOR VIALPANDO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20020405-CA
Priority No. 2.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2000), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B.
Brian presiding.

SHANNON N. ROMERO (7974)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

ALICIA COOK (8851)
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

VICTOR VIALPANDO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20020405-CA
Priority No. 2.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2000), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B.
Brian presiding.
SHANNON N. ROMERO (7974)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

ALICIA COOK (8851)
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
SUMMARY

ii
1-2

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TROOPER LACKED REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP MR. VIALPANDO

2-4

POINT II. THE INTOXILYZER RESULTS LACKED A PROPER
FOUNDATION AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED

4-8

POINT III. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO ACCURATELY
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
8-12
CONCLUSION

13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED

Garcia v. Schwendiman. 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982)

10

Lopez v. Schwendiman. 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986)

10

Moran v. Shaw. 580 P.2d 241 (Utah 1978)

11

Salt Lake City v. Womack. 747 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1987)

5, 6

State v. Baker. 355 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1960) (en banc)

5, 6

State v. Bugger. 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971)

9, 10, 11, 12

State v. Carson. 988 P.2d 225 (Idaho App. 1999)

5, 6, 7

State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)

2,4

State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,1141 (Utah 1989)

8-9

United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984)

2, 4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220

12

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5

11

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(e)

11

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

VICTOR VIALPANDO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20020405-CA
Priority No. 2.

SUMMARY
On appeal Mr. Vialpando is challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress and the inclusion of jury instructions that do not reflect the proper standard for
driving under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Vialpando maintains that the trial court erred
in concluding both that the officer's stop and seizure of him was valid under the Fourth
Amendment and that the intoxilyzer results were reliable and thus admissible. Mr.
Vialpando also maintains that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding
the elements of actual physical control in a criminal case.
In response to Mr. Vialpando's arguments on appeal, the state claims that Mr.
Vialpando was validly stopped and seized based on the totality of the officer's
observations. The state further argues that the trial court properly admitted the intoxilyzer
results at trial and that such results were reliable. Finally, the state asserts that the trial

court properly instructed the jury regarding actual physical control.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TROOPER LACKED REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
TO STOP MR. VIALPANDO

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three levels of police encounters with the
public which are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984) (citation omitted)). It is without question that the
trooper's stop of Mr. Vialpando qualifies as a level II encounter.
The state argues that because the trooper was concerned with the woman's safety,
the stop of Mr. Vialpando was justified and the trooper's suspicion did not dissipate when
the woman was no longer in the vicinity. The state argues that once an officer observes
activity which give rise to suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may stop and briefly
detain an individual to investigate. However, in this instance, the state fails to distinguish
between future potential criminal activity and actual criminal activity.
The trooper testified that he "figured, you know, this — this probably isn't — this
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isn't right, something's going on here. I hit my siren to— to stop him from chasing her
and turned around as soon as I could." (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) The only reason the trooper
gave for turning around was "to make sure she [the woman] was going to be all right."
(Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) At that time, the trooper believed that some type of criminal offense
involving the woman could occur. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) The trooper never testified that he
believed a crime had been committed against the woman. His only concern was with her
welfare, but despite this concern, the trooper never once attempted to find the woman.
(Mot. Hrg. Tr. 12-14.)
In its argument, the state attempts to create reasonable suspicion based on facts
that were never elicited at the hearing. The state argues that given the totality of the
circumstances, the trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that a crime
had been or was about to be committed. (App. Br. 9.) Specifically, the state asks this
Court to consider the following "facts": "the woman ran across a public street in an
apparent attempt to escape from the defendant" and "it appeared that the two were in
some type of an altercation because the trooper heard yelling." (App. Br. 9.) Neither of
these statements involving the woman's "escape" or a suspected altercation were ever
elicited from the trooper at the motion hearing. In fact, the trooper testified that when he
observed the man chasing the woman, he believed something was "not right", and turned
his vehicle around to make sure that the woman was okay. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) The
trooper testified that he wanted Mr. Vialpando to stop because "I wanted to question him
3

about chasing the girl across the street." (Motion Hrg. Tr. 5.) Upon discovering that the
woman was no longer with Vialpando, or anywhere to be found, the trooper's suspicion
that a criminal offense involving the woman might occur in the future was dispelled.
A level II encounter permits a police officer to temporarily detain an individual
based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about
to commit a crime. However, the detention must last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18, quoting Merritt, 736
F.2d at 230 (citation omitted). Here, because the trooper testified that he was concerned
about the woman's welfare and that she may be the victim of a future crime, her absence
from Mr. Vialpando's presence dispelled that suspicion. There was no reason for the
trooper to continue the stop or to question Mr. Vialpando at that point. Accordingly, the
trooper lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Mr. Vialpando. Mr. Vialpando
asks this Court to reverse the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion and remand this
case for further proceedings.

II

THE INTOXILYZER RESULTS LACKED A PROPER FOUNDATION
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED
The state asserts that because the trooper observed Mr. Vialpando for 15 minutes

before administering the Intoxilyzer 5000 test, the trial court properly admitted the test
results into evidence. (App. Br. 11.) Specifically, the state argues that the trooper's pre-
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testing observation of Mr. Vialpando was sufficient to ensure that the test results were not
compromised by vomiting, belching, or the introduction of alcohol into Mr. Vialpando's
mouth prior to the administration of the intoxilyzer test.
It is without dispute that prior to admitting the results of the intoxilyzer test, an
officer must observe the test subject for fifteen minutes prior to the administration of the
test. (App. Br. 11: State v. Baker. 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806, 811 (1960), cited with
approval in Salt Lake Citv v. Womack. 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1987).) The purpose of the
observation period is to ensure no substance is introduced into the test subject's mouth
that would affect the reliability of the test results. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 15; Womack, 747 P.2d
at 1041 n.2 ("[A] foreign substance present in the mouth which might produce an
artificially high result will be removed by absorption during the observation period.1').) A
failure to comply with this requirement renders the test results inadmissible as lacking
foundation. See Baker, 355 P.2d at 811; State v. Carson, 988 P.2d 225 (Idaho App.
1999)(holding that state's failure to demonstrate officer's compliance with fifteen minute
observation period prior to administration of Intoxilyzer 5000 test renders the results
excludable as lacking foundation).
Here, the state argues that defense counsel bore the burden of demonstrating that
the trooper did not comply with the 15 minute observation period at the motion hearing.
(App. Br. 12.) In fact, a defendant shoulders no such burden as the 15 minute observation
period is a foundational requirement that the state must meet before the test results are
5

admitted. See Baker, 355 P.2d at 810.
To meet this foundational requirement, the state must demonstrate that "the level
of surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose
of the requirement." Carson, 988 P.2d at 227. The state argues that this reasonableness
requirement is not necessary as it is a standard that has not been adopted by the Utah
Department of Public Safety. If accepted, the state's position renders the 15 minute
observation period requirement a nullity, elevating form over substance, and ignores this
Court's prior assertion that "a foreign substance present in the mouth which might
produce an artificially high result will be removed by absorption during the observation
period." Womack, 747 P.2d at 1041 n.2. The Carson court's explanation of the level of
observation necessary to show compliance with the 15 minute period of observation
appropriately addresses the intent of the requirement: to ensure that any foreign substance
in the mouth of a test subject which might produce an artificially high result will be
removed by absorption during the observation period.
Here, the trooper testified that he began the 15 minute observation period while in
his patrol car. Mr. Vialpando was in the front seat of the patrol car and the trooper was
driving on the freeway at a late hour. The trooper was required to drive, observe all
traffic laws, and observe Mr. Vialpando both through his peripheral vision and
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speeds. Moreover, this Court must find it unnecessary for an officer to check a test
subject's mouth or inquire whether the test subject has belched, vomited or otherwise
introduced any foreign substance into his or her mouth prior to the administration of the
test. Certainly when a test subject has recently vomited and there is no question that a
foreign substance has been introduced into his or her mouth, it is reasonable to expect
such inspection and inquiries prior to the administration of the test to ensure the reliability
of the results. Under these circumstances, in the absence of reasonable observation, a
visual inspection and verbal queries, there is no assurance that the test results are reliable.
Absent prima facie evidence that these foundational requirements were met, the trial
court erred in admitting the results of the Intoxilyzer 5000.

Ill

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO ACCURATELY
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING ACTUAL PHYSICAL
CONTROL
The state contends that the trial court's instructions provided the jury with the

proper definition of actual physical control. The state further argues that this Court
should not address Mr. Vialpando's argument regarding instruction number five, which
informed the jury that a defendant's subjective intent not to drive will not preclude a
finding of actual physical control, because the instruction was not specifically objected to.
As the state points out, in order to obtain appellate review, some specific preservation of
claims of error must occur at the trial court level. See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,
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conforms to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bugger, instead of citing to the
definition of actual physical control contained in opinions evaluating the validity of
revoking an individual's driver's license in a civil proceeding.
The state further argues that there is no intent to drive requirement set forth in the
Bugger decision, either explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, the state claims that
subsequent Utah Supreme Court decisions clarify that the intent to drive is not a
component of actual physical control. (App. Br. 21.) To reach this conclusion, the state
again relies on standards set forth in civil cases involving the review of an administrative
decision to revoke or suspend an individual's driving privilege rather than criminal cases
involving actual physical control. (App. Br. 20-23; Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d
778, 780-81 (Utah 1986) (driver's license revocation proceeding requires only proof by a
preponderance of the evidence); Garcia v Schwendiman, 645 P.2d at 655 (driver's license
revocation proceeding)). This is precisely the error Mr. Vialpando raises on appeal: civil
standards involving actual physical control have been inappropriately imputed to criminal
matters.
In defining the phrase "actual physical control", a driving under the influence of
alcohol case, the Bugger Court provided a number of examples where actual physical
control may be shown beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) a defendant in the driver's seat of a
vehicle on the traveled portion of a highway with the motor running; (2) a defendant
attempting to steer a vehicle while it is in motion; or (3) a defendant attempting to brake a
10
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that the offense of the possession of marijuana or drug paraphernalia occurs while the
individual is walking down the street, riding as a passenger in a vehicle, or operating a
vehicle. See Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220. This policy reflects the intention of the Utah
Legislature and the Department of Public Safety to regulate potential threats to public
safety rather than actual threats. If actual threats to public safety were the only bases for
revoking or suspending the driving privilege, then the mere possession of drug
paraphernalia while walking down the sidewalk would not result in mandatory license
suspension.
Considering these factors, it is clear that the standard for revoking or suspending
an individual's driving privilege requires a nominal level of proof which is much different
than the level of proof needed to demonstrate the commission of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Under these circumstances, the standard for revoking or suspending an
individual's driving privilege should not be the benchmark for proving the commission of
a criminal offense. Because the jury in this case was instructed as to the civil standard for
actual physical control rather than the standard set forth by the Bugger Court for criminal
cases, this Court should reverse Mr. Vialpando's conviction and remand this case for a
new trial with proper jury instructions.
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CONCLUSION
I; or the reasons stated herein. Mr. Yialpando asks this Court to reverse his
Lslon and remand this case for a new trial.

s5£

SHANNON ROMl-RO
Attorney for Defendant
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